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Interiority as the Cutting Edge  
between Theory and Practice:  
A First Person Perspective 
David Coghlan 
 
The three realms of meaning: practical knowing, theory and interiority 
provide a framework for understanding the epistemological challenges 
confronting action researchers. Action researchers have two external hori-
zons: that of practice and that of theory. Practice engages with the world 
of practical knowing, where the challenges are the successful completion 
of practical tasks. Theory engages the realm of scholarship as action re-
searchers seek to develop understanding of, for example, the dynamics of 
organization and change. Interiority involves shifting from what we know 
to how we know, and is a process of intellectual self-awareness. Interiority 
goes beyond practical knowing and theory, not by negating them or leav-
ing them behind, but appreciating them and recognizing their limitations. 
Interiority is the integrating factor that enables action researchers to hold 
both, to appreciate the value of both and to move from one to the other 
appropriately. It is a process at the cutting edge of integrating theory,  
practice and research. 
Key words: action research, practical knowing, theory, interiority,  
Bernard Lonergan 
At a conference dinner two years ago, I was asked what my theory of my 
engagement in organization development/action research was. Quite sponta-
neously, I replied that it was about integrating practical knowing, theory and 
interiority. Whatever about the surprise expressed by my dinner companion 
who asked the question, I was surprised by own answer. I was not able to 
develop my answer on that occasion, and I made a mental note that some day 
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I would take the opportunity to explore and try to articulate more fully what I 
meant. I have since undertaken this exploration, and so in this contribution I 
seek to engage in a first person philosophical reflection on how I understand 
my practice as an action researcher, so as to contribute to our developing 
understanding of the scholarship of practice. I ground this inquiry in the work 
of the theologian-philosopher, Bernard Lonergan on whose empirical method 
I base my way of working (Coghlan 2008, 2009, 2010). The aim of this 
article is to explore a philosophical basis for action researchers as contribu-
tion to the continuing developments of action research’s self-understanding 
(Shotter 2007; Avenir 2009). The structure of this exploration is as follows. 
In the first part of the article I reflect on the philosophical process of first 
person practice, and focus on the operations of human knowing which yield a 
general empirical method. In the second part, I outline some of the character-
istics of meaning and introduce Lonergan’s (1972, 1993, 1996) notion of the 
realms of meaning: commonsense, theory and interiority as a framing for an 
epistemology for the action researcher. Finally, I reflect on my framing of my 
work as an action researcher. 
First person practice 
First person practice means that attention to our own values, assumptions, 
beliefs and ways of thinking and acting are afforded a central place of inquiry 
in our action research practice. It involves attending to how we experience 
ourselves in inquiry and in action (Marshall 1999; Sherman/Torbert 2000). 
Philosophically, first person practice means that, rather than observing our-
selves as objects from the outside, we experience ourselves as subjects with 
direct awareness of how we think and act. Varela and Stears (1999) demon-
strate how first person practice forms the basis of a science of consciousness, 
as it engages the dynamics of subjective experience with validation. In order 
to ground this science of consciousness, they argue, it is necessary to have a 
method. They outline two dimensions for such a method: providing a clear 
procedure for accessing some phenomenal domain, and providing a clear 
means for an expression and validation within a community of observers who 
have a familiarity with such procedures.  
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Human knowing comprises an invariant series of distinct operations: ex-
periencing, understanding and judging (Dewey 1933; Lonergan 1992; Mey-
nell 1999). Experience occurs at the empirical level of consciousness, and is 
an interaction of inner and outer events, or data of sense and data of con-
sciousness. We not only experience external data through our five senses, but 
we also experience internal data as we imagine, remember, feel, and think. 
We also experience ourselves as seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, remem-
bering and imagining. Sensory data are what we experience but do not yet 
understand. So we ask questions, and the answers come in the form of in-
sights, which are creative acts of understanding, of grasping and formulating 
patterns, unities, relationships and explanations in response to questions 
posed to our experience. While we might not know yet if a particular current 
search is intelligent, we anticipate intelligent answers. Understanding occurs 
at the intellectual level of consciousness as we move beyond experience to 
explanation. While insights are common, they are not always satisfactory 
answers to our questions. The question then is, does the insight fit the evi-
dence? This opens up a question for reflection. Is it so? Yes or no? Maybe. I 
don’t know. So we move to a new level of the cognitional process, where we 
marshal and weigh evidence and assess its sufficiency. We are at the rational 
level of consciousness. We do not merely know; we also make decisions and 
act (the responsible level of consciousness). At this level we ask what courses 
of action are open to us, and we review options, weight choices and decide. 
The responsible level of consciousness is added to the empirical, intellectual 
and rational levels.  
From the cognitional operations of experience, understanding and judge-
ment, Bernard Lonergan (1972) articulates a general empirical method, which 
is simply the enactment of the knowing process. This method is grounded in:  
– Attention to data of sense and of consciousness (experience). 
– Envisaging possible explanations of that data (understanding). 
– Preferring as probable or certain the explanations which provide the best 
account for the data (judgement).  
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Engaging this method requires the dispositions to perform the operations of 
attentiveness, intelligence and reasonableness, to which is added responsibil-
ity when we seek to take action.  
The general empirical method of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable 
and responsible is a normative heuristic pattern of related and recurrent 
operations that yield ongoing and cumulative results. It envisages all data, 
both of sense and of consciousness. It does not treat objects without taking 
into consideration the operations of experience, understanding and judge-
ment. It enables us to appropriate our own conscious reality as existential 
subjects. It provides a key to the relationship between questioning and an-
swering; it is a framework for collaborative creativity that deals with different 
kinds of questions, each with its own focus. So questions for understanding 
specific data (What is happening here?) have a different focus from questions 
for reflection (Does this fit?) or from questions of responsibility (What ought 
I do?). As conscious subjects we can attend to what is going on, both inside 
and outside us, inquire intelligently, judge reasonably and decide freely and 
act responsibly. As conscious existential subjects, we can accept and confront 
the fact that it is up to us to decide that our actions will be responsible, that 
our judgements be reasonable, our investigations intelligent and that we 
advert to data of both sense and consciousness. The general empirical method 
provides a basis for internalising action research practice (Coghlan 2008, 
2009) and for working with the different modalities that form the field of 
action research (Coghlan 2010).  
Meaning 
We live in a world mediated by meaning. Indeed, meaning is at the heart of 
human living. Meaning does not lie within our direct immediate experience, 
but rather goes beyond experience to what is understood, affirmed and val-
ued. As such, meaning itself is insecure because as well as truth, there is 
error. There is fiction as well as fact, deceit as well as honesty, myth as well 
as science. Meaning performs a number of important functions. It performs a 
cognitive function, whereby we engage in acts of understanding. It performs 
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an effective function, whereby there is the world that we make through our 
intentions, visioning, planning, enacting and evaluating.  
Meaning is not a simple matter, as several levels of meaning may exist in 
a given experience. At any one time, we may be concerned with only a single 
meaning in a given situation; other meanings may be ignored or left for later 
reflection. ‘Differentiation of consciousness’ is a notion that enables us to 
identify the meaning(s) sought in a given experience and so to choose how 
act. In other words, if we are aware of the meaning(s) contained in a given 
situation, we may choose to act appropriately.  
The field of action research hangs on meaning. Organizations and com-
munities are formed through common meaning formed by acts of meaning. 
They are held together by common fields of experience, common modes of 
understanding, common measures of judgement and common consent. There 
are many carriers of meaning: language, symbols, art, spontaneous intersub-
jectivity, and the lives and actions of people, to cite the more important ones. 
Through meaning’s constitutive function, action researchers engage in 
change at individual group, organizational and societal levels by engaging 
with how organizations engage with their meaning-making functions of 
visioning, planning, enacting and evaluating (Coghlan/Rashford 2006). 
Understanding and working to change organizational actions requires inquiry 
into the constructions of meaning that individuals make about themselves, 
their situation and the world, and how their actions may be driven by assump-
tions and compulsions as well as by values. In a similar vein, large systems 
and groups hold their own shared meanings which direct their actions. Such 
meanings are likely to be hidden and taken for granted (Schein 2010). 
Realms of meaning: Practical knowing, theory and interiority 
Lonergan (1972) reflects on three realms of meaning: commonsense, the-
ory and interiority. These three realms of meaning are integrally linked to the 
process of human knowing.  
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The realm of practical knowing 
While Lonergan uses the term, commonsense, to capture the notion of practi-
cal knowing, I am using the latter term. Practical knowing focuses on the 
interest and concerns of human living and the successful performance of 
daily tasks (Lonergan 1992). It seeks to help us deal with situations as they 
arise and to discover immediate solutions that will work. In the realm of the 
practical we are interested in knowing, not for its own sake, but for develop-
ing more intelligent and successful ways of living. It focuses on the concrete 
and the particular. If we do not apply our intelligence when we are making 
coffee, then the coffee will be undrinkable.  
At its core, practical knowing describes things as they relate to us; it is a 
descriptive, subject-centred context of knowing, that is not interested in 
universal solutions. It has no use for technical language (though it might use 
it) or formal mode of speech; it moves fluently between saying and meanings 
and undertakes communication as a work of art, drawing on resources of 
language, support of tone and volume, eloquence and facial expression, 
pauses, questions and omissions. It operates in everyday descriptive lan-
guage, through focusing the mind on intentions and actions, rather than the 
intrinsic properties of things. The content of that practical accumulation and 
store of knowledge is not definitions or universally valid propositions, but 
rather proverbs and rules of advice.   
The realm of theory  
The realm of theory is not interested in things and people as they relate to us, 
but rather as they relate to one another in a verifiable manner. Theoretically 
differentiated consciousness operates systematically, is governed by logic and 
uses language in a technical and explanatory manner. Explanation has to be 
accurate, clear and precise so the ambiguities of practical language are 
averted. Special methods are required to govern different types of investiga-
tion. There are, of course, intentions and desires to relate theory to applica-
tion, but such application is typically after the fact and, as action research has 
well demonstrated over the years, involves an entirely different process. 
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The relationship between practical knowing and theory 
The distinction between practical knowing and theory is not merely a distinc-
tion between practical and intellectual patterns of experience. Although they 
have different concerns and scope, they are not isolated from one another. 
Practical knowing may mistakenly claim general theoretical applicability. 
Practical knowing does develop general principles, but these generalizations 
are concerned with the concrete, practical affairs of a specific context, not 
with universal principles that scientific theory advances. In a similar vein, 
practical knowing may claim that theoretical investigation is pointless and 
that theory is irrelevant.  
The quest for general theories typically begins from the practical reality of 
individual persons. Lewin’s famous observation of the waiter’s ability to hold 
a complex order of multiple cups of coffee and pieces of cake in his head 
while the order was still live, only to forget it once the bill had been paid, led 
to the research on the psychological tensions of unfinished tasks, called the 
Zeigarnik effect (Marrow, 1969). Zeigarnik was one of the students at the 
cafe with Lewin that day. Practical knowing may also develop from theory. 
As scholars disseminate their work, their insights become part of the general 
store of knowledge and action in the practical world.   
There is a fundamental opposition between the world of practical knowing 
and that of theory. Both present different ways in which objects are consid-
ered. Lonergan (1972) refers to Eddington’s (1928) famous discussion of the 
table as a pertinent example. In the realm of practical knowing, the table is 
solid, has colour and shape and needs to be capable of supporting the weight 
that we wish to put on it. For the scientist, the table is a vacuum of colourless 
wavicles so minute that the table is mostly empty space. Eddington struggled 
with the question of which was the real table. Was it that of the scientist or 
that of the ordinary person? He was not able to resolve this question and he 
opted that the table of the scientist was the real table. In the world of practical 
knowing, we can refer validly to sunrise and sunset, while in terms of scien-
tific theory the sun neither rises nor sets. These examples from the natural 
sciences seek merely to illustrate that there are different realms of meaning 
and that we can hold seemingly contradictory perspectives across them. 
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In the practical mindset, deciding what to do, what is good/bad, 
right/wrong, what works or does not work etc. is haphazard and uneven, as 
the practical mind aims at the practical and short term, and is difficult to 
objectify. In the realm of theory, clarity and rigour can be gained within the 
scope of logic and mathematics, but it cannot deal with the practical realm or 
critique its own limitations or provide criteria between conflicting theories. 
Hence there is a need for something that is beyond both the realm of practical 
knowing and of theory. 
The realm of interiority 
The critical demand is a turn from the outer world of practical knowing and 
theory to the appropriation of one’s own interiority i.e. to oneself as a 
knower. This is a heightened intentional consciousness, and is what Lonergan 
(1972) calls ‘interiority’. The turn to interiority is not just cognition but an 
appropriation of self and one’s mind. It is a first person activity. The goal of 
interiority is a turn from the outer world of practical knowing and theory, 
with the ability to recognize their competence and to meet the demands of 
both without confusing them. Interiority involves shifting from what we 
know to how we know, a process of intellectual self-awareness. Interiority 
analysis involves using one’s knowledge of how the mind works to critique 
an intellectual search for truth in any area. It is a first person activity. As 
Lonergan (1972: 85) expresses it, ‘It is only through the long and confused 
twilight of philosophic initiation that one can find one’s way into interiority 
and achieve through self-appropriation a basis, a foundation , that is distinct 
from commonsense and theory, that acknowledges their disparateness, that 
accounts for both and critically grounds them both’.  
Many elements in contemporary philosophy point towards interiority, 
through an emphasis on the subject. Modern philosophy, under the influence 
of positivism, avoided the issue of the subject in is/her acts of consciousness 
and so the subject became neglected and indeed truncated (Lonergan 1974). 
Existentialists examine subjective experience, particularly in the face of 
meaningless, death and anxiety. Through an emphasis on ‘intentionality 
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analysis’, phenomenological method focuses on subjective activities: feel-
ings, mental activities and artistic expression (Ladkin 2005).  
Interiority is a theory about theories, a shift to a new perspective. It is go-
ing beyond practical knowing and theory, not by negating them or leaving 
them behind, but by appreciating them and recognizing their limitations. 
Questions of science can be settled by appealing to observable data. How-
ever, in the world of interiority data are not sensible or observable, but belong 
to the private world of intentional consciousness.  
– Interiority is characterized by awareness of the actual processes of human 
knowing and by reflection on the operations of knowing. It calls for a self-
knowledge not just of our feelings, dreams, motivations but of how we 
see, think, judge, imagine, remember, criticize, evaluate, conclude etc. 
Grasping the activity of human understanding is the main characteristic of 
interiority, how it happens in us. This is not just another theory about hu-
man knowing but it is judging all theories about human knowing in the 
light of data of consciousness. 
– Awareness of how understanding unfolds reveals how there are operative 
and immanent norms in the unfolding of understanding, in how the mind 
works. By using the general empirical method, we can attend to data, 
think a matter through, and ask the relevant questions. We can know when 
we have reached reasonable conclusions and can take responsibility for 
them. Interiority is being faithful to the deepest and the best inclinations 
of mind and heart.  
– We do make mistakes and we can reflect and discover our mistakes. Then 
we investigate the source of our misunderstandings and false judgements, 
how we did not attend to all the data or how we jumped to conclusions. 
We can learn about or own style of learning, of how, for instance, tem-
perament plays a role. We can learn to recognize our biases, prejudices, 
fears and anxieties.  
Action science provides a valuable expression of the challenge for interiority. 
Argyris (2004; Argyris/Putnam/Smith 1985) invites us to attend to how we 
act on the basis of privately untested hypotheses, such as inferences and 
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attributions. As he argues most persuasively, it is not more espoused theory 
that we need, but rather insight into theory-in-use that governs behaviour. 
Such insight requires double-loop learning. In my view, the techniques of 
action science, such double-loop learning, the ladder of inference and treating 
facts as hypotheses, provide a rigorous application of interiority, through 
their focus on how we know rather than on what we know.  
Once we have a basic understanding of the different realms of meaning 
and can move from one to another as a given situation requires, interiority 
can be a foundation for using the other realms of meaning. In fully differenti-
ated and integrated consciousness, perhaps a long and arduous personal 
achievement, the realms of practical knowing, theory and interiority enrich 
each other. A person can recognize and understand the distinct realms, shift 
between them and relate them to one another. Had Eddington been able to 
differentiate between the realms of meaning, he would have been able to 
recognise that both tables are real. 






In summary, figure 1 captures the relationship between the operations of 
knowing and the realms of meaning. Practical knowing works in a descriptive 
mode and is grounded in experience. Theory works in an explanatory mode, 
and is grounded in the activity of understanding. Interiority works in a critical 
mode, and is grounded in the activity of judgement.  
Experience Understanding Judgement 






Knowing Theory Interiority 
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Lewin on realms of meaning 
The basic theory underlying action research, as framed by Lewin, is found in 
his famous statement (Bargal, in press).  
It is important to understand clearly that social research concerns itself 
with two rather different types of questions, namely the study of general 
laws of group life and the diagnosis of a specific situation. Problems of 
general laws deal with the relation between possible conditions and possi-
ble results. They are expressed in “if so” propositions….To act cor-
rectly…he has to know too the specific character of the situation at 
hand… For any field of action both types of scientific research are needed 
(Lewin 1997: 145).  
In my view, Lewin’s statement implies Lonergan’s three realms of meaning. 
If the general laws of group life mark the realm of theory, and the dynamics 
of a specific situation mark the realm of practical knowing, then their coming 
together in action research involves interiority, in order to differentiate 
between them and to use both, as Lewin argues.  
This may be illustrated as a scissors, where the upper blade represents the 
general laws (theory) and the lower blade the dynamics of the concrete 
situation (practical knowing). The upper blade provides a focus on constructs 
while the lower blade yields insights and working hypotheses. The cutting 
movement, where the two blades come together in ‘a field of action’ is where 
action and inquiry merge, and where interiority becomes essential (figure 2).  
The three realms of meaning: practical knowing, theory and interiority 
provide a framework for understanding the challenges confronting the action 
researcher. Traditional scholarship in the field of organization and manage-
ment studies has had its difficulties in relating to the world of practice. Like-
wise the world of practice has found itself alienated from the field of scholar-
ship. The two worlds have become polarized. Action researchers straddle the 
two worlds. Practice engages with the world of practical knowing, where the 
challenges are the successful completion of practical tasks of organization 
change and development. Theory engages the realm of scholarship as action 
research seeks to develop understand of the dynamics of organization and 
change. In this paper, I argue that interiority is the integrating factor for the 
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action researcher, and is at the cutting edge of theory and practice, so I offer 
it as a contribution to our understanding of the scholarship of practice (Raelin 
2007; Antonacopoulou 2004).  














Practical knowing, theory and interiority for the action researcher 
The field of organization development may provide an example of how the 
three realms of meaning may be perceived. Organization development com-
prises a range of theories built on research on topics such as change, interven-
tion, the role of consultants, to name a few (Coghlan and Shani, 2010). It 
draws on the extensive research done in the fields of management, organiza-
tion theory, group dynamics, leadership, strategy, social psychology, organ-
izational sociology and so on. At the same time, there is the world of OD 
practitioners, which is often atheoretical and is founded on the learned practi-
cal experience of practitioners as to what works and doesn’t work. Interiority 
provides a frame whereby both theory (based on research) and practice 
(based on what works in practitioners’ experience) may be viewed critically 
and theory may be applied in a given situation, for example, what interven-
tion may be appropriate in a particular setting under certain circumstances in 
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which brings theory to practitioners in a form that enables them engage with 
theory in the context of practice acts as agent for interiority, albeit without 
using the terms.   
Discussion and personal reflection  
As I reflect on my work in the mode of first person practice, several themes 
present themselves that capture the challenges of interiority, not merely for 
me, but what I offer to action researchers for them consider their own themes. 
I discuss briefly how the realms of meaning are operative in my teaching, in 
attending to process in the present tense and in writing.  
Revans’ praxeology 
As a university-based scholar my work with students across the age and 
experience range is deeply influenced by the writings of Reg Revans, the 
creator of action learning. Revans (1971) articulated a theory of action or 
‘praxeology’ as he termed it, comprising engagement with three cyclical 
systems - alpha, beta and gamma. System alpha focuses on the investigation 
of the problem, based on the managerial value system, the external environ-
ment and available internal resources. System beta focuses on its resolution, 
what decisions and cycles of negotiation are required to implement the 
decision through trial and error. System gamma focuses on the learning as 
experienced uniquely by each of the participants and involving self-
awareness and questioning. These three processes utilize analysis, cycles of 
action and reflection and attention to learning.  
Revans’ praxeology engages practical knowing, theory and interiority. 
System alpha is largely a theory activity in how it generates understanding of 
the origins of the problem, though interiority activity of what and how value 
judgements about desired outcomes are also implicit. System beta focuses on 
the resolution of the problem, what decisions and cycles of negotiation are 
required to implement the decision through trial and error in the company of 
peers. This is largely a practical activity as workable solutions are sought and 
tested. System gamma focuses on the learning as experienced uniquely by 
each of the participants and involving self-awareness and questioning, that is, 
 Interiority as the Cutting Edge between Theory and Practice 301 
  
 
interiority. My andragogical activity focuses on teaching learners the general 
empirical method so as to facilitate them to engage in a rigorous analysis of 
their settings and of the issues that they seek to change, to engage in address-
ing the issues and to attend to their own learning in and through the process 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). In terms of Revans’ praxeology, students 
work to learn how to analyse situations, to engage in cycles of action and 
reflection while always keeping an eye to not only what they are learning but 
how they are learning. In this way they are learning to move through the three 
realms of meaning, and to recognise how interiority enables them to under-
stand how each realm has its role in their learning.  
Attention to process in the present tense 
Attention to process in the present tense appears to me to be a critical dimen-
sion of the practice of interiority. This is something I learned from Edgar 
Schein. One of the most significant books in my own development was his 
Process Consultation (Schein, 1969). When I was introduced to that little 
book in the early 1970s, my thinking was transformed and I began to give my 
attention to process issues in groups and in learning. In a seminal article, 
Chandler and Torbert (2003) explore how first, second and third person voice 
and practice may be engaged in the past, present and future. Much of what 
we refer to as qualitative research is focused on the past. Interiority builds on 
the past, takes place in the present with a view to shaping the future. Attend-
ing to data of consciousness in the present tense, i.e. interiority, finds differ-
ent expressions in the literature: attending to one’s theory-in use (Argyris and 
Schon, 1974), one’s ‘action logics’ (Torbert and Associates 2004), ‘inner and 
outer arcs of attention’ (Marshall 1999) and ‘accessing one’s ignorance’ 
(Schein 1999), to cite some examples.  
The general empirical method facilitates working in the present tense 
(Coghlan 2009). Being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible in 
executing the practical task of being helpful to a group engaged in trying to 
accomplish its task is demanding on theory, in that the pertinent process 
issues identified and being worked on must be grounded in robust theory, 
appropriately used. It is demanding on interiority through the self-reflection 
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of the action researcher as to whether, in any given moment, an intervention 
may be appropriate.  
In an earlier work (Coghlan 2008), I recount that while at a meeting of 
researchers and managers I felt that the meeting was getting bogged down. I 
was processing what was happening and wondering whether my feeling was 
due to me losing track of the meeting or whether there was something hap-
pening in the meeting. My insight was that there was something happening in 
the meeting that was causing it to become somewhat fractious and that this 
insight was that there were philosophical differences among some of the 
participants about the nature and purpose of the research. The chair sud-
denly asked me to comment on what I thought was going on. My theory was 
that there was an emerging fundamental difference between those who un-
derstood the research as verification and those who understood it as discov-
ery. In practical (commonsense) terms I had to respond to the chair’s stimu-
lus and to do so in a manner that would enable the group to receive its own 
insight and that would keep the conversation going. I was aware of these 
options and was aware that my insight was an inference and had not been 
tested. Accordingly, I posed a question to the group and invited consideration 
of the two ways of understanding the research that were apparent to me in 
the conversation. A fruitful discussion followed.  
What is relevant about this story is that I attended to the data of my con-
sciousness and was aware that my understanding was an untested inference 
and that then shaped my concern for how I might respond to the chair’s 
invitation. The theory of conflicting epistemologies, while relevant, might not 
have been helpful to share as it might not have engaged the practising man-
agers in the room if a discussion on the philosophical nature of research had 
ensued. My awareness that I had to balance both theory and practical know-
ing in the concrete situation led me to examine my own cognitive processes 
and so to find an appropriate way of responding that kept the conversation 
going.  




An important expression of interiority for action researchers is how they 
write. Marshall (2008) reflects on the role of form in her action research 
writing, and suggests that we invoke the writer in us and our own direct voice 
in whatever form it takes. Schein (1999, 2009a, 2009b) provides useful 
examples of how to engage interiority in his own writing. He consistently 
works from his experience to be practically helpful to clients (practical 
knowing), and builds theory from is experience. At the same time, he demon-
strates how reflects on his own thinking as he works to be helpful, frequently 
identifying errors in how he misread situations and intervened inappropri-
ately, and how his own theory and practice has been shaped by this reflection. 
His principles for process consultation and clinical inquiry emphasize the 
need to be constantly in touch with what is going on in oneself, particularly 
through accessing one’s own ignorance and sharing the problem (Schein 
1999). This article is itself an effort in interiority, in that I am presenting this 
exploration as a first person inquiry, rather than in the more traditional third 
person philosophical mode only. 
Conclusions 
Interiority marks the unity of the human subject, through recognising the 
integral nature of the cognitive process and appropriating the data of con-
sciousness accordingly, that is, to engage in differentiation of consciousness. 
Lonergan (1972: 84) remarks, ‘It is, of course, only in a rather highly devel-
oped consciousness that the distinction between the realms of meaning is to 
be carried out’.  
The quest to achieve interiority, therefore, is a personal first person quest 
(Eidle 1990). As explored above, first person practice means that, rather than 
observing ourselves as objects from the outside, we experience ourselves as 
subjects with direct awareness of how we act and so learn to grasp our own 
interiority. It involves applying the general empirical method to our own 
process of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. 
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Articulating my response to the question put to me at dinner has itself 
been an exercise in interiority. It has challenged me, not so much to engage 
with the theory and practice of being an action researcher but to examine my 
own way of knowing as I engage with the worlds of practical knowing and 
theory. I have sought to explore how interiority involves shifting from what I 
know to how I know and accordingly how this is a process of intellectual 
self-awareness. Interiority goes beyond practical knowing and theory, not by 
negating them but by appreciating them and recognizing their limitations. 
Interiority is not merely a theory of operating it is an appropriation of the self 
and one’s mind. 
Self-appropriation is a movement towards interiority. It is not something 
one can talk about in ordinary common sense conversation, nor is it some-
thing that can be handled adequately with any amount of theory. It regards 
immediate internal experience. It is a third field of development (Loner-
gan 1996:114).  
The epistemological problem is to differentiate these patterns of experience 
from one another, and to appropriate the various situations that present 
themselves to us. In Varela and Stears’ (1999) terms, this is an exploration of 
the science of consciousness. As an action researcher who engages with both 
practical knowing and theory concurrently, as conceived by Lewin, I under-
stand interiority to be the integrating factor that enables me to hold both, to 
appreciate the value of both and to move from one to the other appropriately. 
It is a process at the cutting edge of theory, practice and research and which 
challenges me (and other action researchers) to facilitate others to learn, to 
attend to process in the present tense and to impact how I write and dissemi-
nate action research.  
References 
Antonacopoulou, E. (2004): The dynamics of reflective practice: the relationship between 
learning and changing. In: M. Reynolds/R. Vince (eds.): Organizing Reflection. Al-
dershot: Ashgate: 47-64. 
Argyris, C. (2004): Reasons and Rationalizations. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Argyris, C./Putnam, R./Smith, D. (1985): Action Science. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Argyris, C./Schon, D.A. (1974): Theory-in-Practice: Increasing Professional Effective-
ness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 Interiority as the Cutting Edge between Theory and Practice 305 
  
 
Avenir, J.-M. (2009): A methodology framework for constructing generic knowledge with 
intended value for both academics and practice. In: B. Brogger/O. Eikeland (eds.): 
Turning to Practice with Action Research. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang: 141-178. 
Bargal, D. (in press): Kurt Lewin’s vision of organizational and social change: The 
interdependence, of theory, research and action/practice. In: D. Boje/B. Burnes/J. 
Hassard (eds): The Routledge Companion to Change. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Chandler, D./Torbert, W.A. (2003): Transforming inquiry and action: Interweaving flavors 
of action research. In: Action Research, 1(2): 133-152. 
Coghlan, D. (2008): Authenticity as first person practice: An exploration based on Bernard 
Lonergan. In: Action Research, 6(3): 351-366. 
Coghlan, D. (2009): Toward a philosophy of clinical inquiry/research. In: Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 45(1): 106-121. 
Coghlan, D. (2010): Seeking common ground in the diversity and diffusion of action 
research and collaborative management research action modalities: Toward a general 
empirical method. In: W.A. Pasmore/A.B. (Rami) Shani/R. Woodman (eds.): Research 
in Organization Change and Development, Vol 18. Brinkley, UK: Emerald: 149-181. 
Coghlan, D./Brannick, T. (2010): Doing Action Research in Your Own Organization. 3rd 
ed. London: Sage. 
Coghlan, D./Rashford, N.S. (2006): Organizational Change and Strategy: An Interlevels 
Dynamics Approach. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Coghlan D./Shani, A.B. (Rami) (2010): Editors’ introduction: Organization development: 
Toward a mapping of the terrain. In: D Coghlan/A.B. (Rami) Shani (eds.): Fundamen-
tals of Organization Development, Vol 1. London: Sage: xxiii-xxviii. 
Dewey, J. (1933): How We Think. Lexington, MA: Heath.  
Eidle, W.R. (1990): The Self-Appropriation of Interiority: A Foundation for Psychology. 
New York: Peter Lang. 
Eddington, A. (1928): The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Ladkin, D. (2005): The enigma of subjectivity: How might phenomenology help action 
researchers negotiate the relationship between ‘self’, ‘other’ and’ truth’? In: Action 
Research, 3(1): 108-126. 
Lewin, K. (1997): Action research and minority problems. In: K. Lewin, Resolving Social 
Conflicts. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. (original publica-
tion, 1946): 143-154. 
Lonergan, B.J. (1972): Method in Theology. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. 
Lonergan, B.J. (1974): The subject. In: W. F Ryan/B. Tyrrell (eds.): A Second Collection: 
Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan. London: Darton, Longman and Todd: 69-86. 
Lonergan, B.J. (1992): Insight: An Essay in Human Understanding. The Collected Works 
of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 3, F. Crowe and R. Doran (eds.). Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Lonergan, B.J. (1993): Dimensions of meaning. In Collection. The Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 4, F. Crowe and R. Doran (eds.). Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press: 232-245.  
Lonergan, B.J. (1996): Time and meaning. In Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-
1964. The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 6, R. C. Croken, F. Crowe and 
R. Doran (eds.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 94-121.  
306 David Coghlan 
   
Marrow, A.J. (1969): The Practical Theorist: The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin. New 
York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University. 
Marshall, J. (1999): Living life as inquiry. In: Systemic Practice and Action Research, 
12(2): 155-171.  
Marshall, J. (2008): Finding form in writing for action research. In P. Reason and H. 
Bradbury (eds.) Handbook of Action Research. 2nd ed. London: Sage: 682-695.  
Meynell, H. (1999): Redirecting Philosophy: Reflections on the Nature of Knowledge 
from Plato to Lonergan. Toronto: Toronto University Press. 
Raelin, J.A. (2007): Toward an epistemology of practice. In: Academy of Management 
Learning and Education, 6: 495-519. 
Revans, R. (1971): Developing Effective Managers. London: Longman. 
Schein, E.H. (1969): Process Consultation: Its Role in Organization Development. Read-
ing, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Schein, E.H. (1999): Process Consultation Revisited: Building the Helping Relationship. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Schein, E.H. (2009a): Helping. San Francisco: Berrett-Kohler. 
Schein, E.H. (2009b): Reactions, reflections, rejoinders and a challenge. In: Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 41(1): 141-158. 
Schein, E.H. (2010): Organizational Culture and Leadership. 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
Sherman, F./Torbert, W.R. (2000): Transforming Social Inquiry: Transforming Social 
Practice. Boston: Kluwer. 
Shotter, J. (2007): With what kind of science should action research be contrasted? In: 
International Journal of Action Research, 3(1-2): 665-92. 
Torbert, W. and Associates (2004): Action Inquiry. San Francisco: Berrett-Kohler. 
Varela, F.S. and Stear, J. (1999): First person methodology: what, why how? In: Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 6(2-3): 1-14. 
 
Acknowledgments 
I thank Geralyn Hynes and Patrick Riordan for their comments in the ini-
tial development of this article and the reviewers and editors of the Inter-
national Journal of Action Research for pushing me to go deeper into my 
own interiority. Thanks to Geraldine Kiesal who posed the original ques-
tion at a dinner in Lyon and Marc Bonnet who was the gracious host and 
created the environment for the discussion. 
 
About the Author 
David Coghlan is an Associate Professor at the School of Business, Trin-
ity College Dublin, Ireland and is a Fellow of the College. He is currently 
on the editorial reviews boards of: Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 
 Interiority as the Cutting Edge between Theory and Practice 307 
  
 
Action Research, Action Learning: Research and Practice, among others. 
Recent books include Doing Action Research in Your Own Organization 
(Sage, 3rd ed. 2010) and Collaborative Strategic Improvement through 
Network Action Learning (Elgar, 2011). He is co-editor of the 4 volume 
set, Fundamentals of Organization Development (Sage, 2010).  
 
Author’s address: 
School of Business, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland. 
E-mail: dcoghlan@tcd.ie 
 
